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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter is before the court on an appeal by Durwood 
B. Knepp in this social security disability benefits case. 
Knepp filed an application for disability benefits on March 
25, 1994, alleging that he had been disabled as a result of 
an accident on October 23, 1984. Knepp last had been 
insured for benefits on June 30, 1991, and therefore must 
show that he was disabled on or before that date to obtain 
the benefits. 
 
There was a hearing held before an administrative law 
judge on April 3, 1997, following which on May 6, 1997, the 
ALJ rendered her decision denying Knepp's application. 
Knepp filed a request for review of the decision of the ALJ 
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on May 9, 1997, with the Appeals Council which denied his 
request on November 18, 1997. Thus, the decision of the 
ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner of 
Social Security. 
 
Thereafter, Knepp filed his complaint in the district court 
on January 20, 1998, seeking review of the Commissioner's 
final decision. The parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment that were assigned to a magistrate judge for a 
report and recommendation. On January 26, 1999, the 
magistrate judge recommended that the district court affirm 
the decision of the ALJ. On February 8, 1999, Kneppfiled 
an objection to the magistrate judge's report and 
recommendation, but by a comprehensive memorandum 
opinion and order entered March 31, 1999, the district 
court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary 
judgment. 
 
The evidence in the case, as developed before the ALJ, is 
as follows. Knepp sustained severe injuries as a result of a 
high voltage electrocution on October 23, 1984, at his place 
of work. See app. at 73. Knepp testified that the 
electrocution "took off my left arm, my shoulders, down my 
back, blew both cheeks off my butt, the calves off my legs, 
the heels off my feet, toe off my left foot, and here on the 
abdomen." Id. at 25. At the time of the accident Knepp had 
been moving a welding machine when it came into contact 
with an overhead 17,000 volt power source. See id. at 94. 
Knepp required immediate hospitalization at North Carolina 
Memorial Hospital, and later continued treatment and 
rehabilitation at the Geisinger Medical Center in 
Pennsylvania. See id. at 94-99 (North Carolina Memorial 
Hospital report); id. at 100-141 (Geisinger Medical Center 
reports). 
 
As a result of the injuries, Knepp was awarded disability 
insurance benefits from October 23, 1984 to May 31, 1986. 
In the application for benefits at issue now, Knepp alleged 
that he continued to be disabled as a result of the injuries 
he sustained in his October 1984 accident through his last 
insured date. These injuries included: 
 
       1) loss of his non-dominant left arm (amputated 
       above the elbow joint); 
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       2) loss of body mass in numerous areas, including the 
       stomach, shoulder, back, buttocks, calves and 
       heels of both feet; 
 
       3) loss of the fifth toe on his left foot; 
 
       4) burns to 34% of his body (with third degree burns 
       over 20% of his body); and 
 
       5) residual pain associated with the electrocution. 
 
See Admin. Tr. at 106 (disability report). Knepp explained 
that these injuries prevented him from working because the 
loss of his left arm "has affected balance and the ability to 
do any sort of construction work. Back injury with accident 
causes daily pain. Skin grafts on feet and calves crack and 
bleed." Id. Knepp testified at the hearing before the ALJ 
that he had not worked since his accident on October 23, 
1984. See app. at 12. He stated, "I've tried several things 
and it just don't [sic] work." Id. 
 
Knepp's last effort at working involved chores related to 
his family cattle farm. Knepp testified that, in particular, he 
was able to feed some of the cattle by filling a feed cart and 
pushing it. See id. at 13. Knepp did state, however, that 
there were times when he would need assistance. See id. 
Knepp spent approximately half of his day doing work on 
the farm. 
 
Knepp testified that since 1989 he has experienced pain 
in his lower back. See id. at 15-16. Knepp stated that this 
pain affected his ability to walk. 
 
       Well, there's time when you just can't hardly walk, you 
       know, from the pain in the back, hip and, and legs. 
       You, you got trouble walking, you got trouble sitting, 
       you can't stand, I, even today, I can't stand at any 
       period of time at all. I, you know, have to move a little 
       or sit down or do something. 
 
Id. at 16-17. 
 
Knepp stated that he started treating his back pain in 
earnest in 1989 and 1990 with Dr. Bainey, a chiropractor, 
and Dr. Langton, a physician. See id. at 26. Knepp 
continues to see Dr. Langton and Dr. Rhodes, another 
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chiropractor. See id. Knepp stated that he has a constant, 
stabbing pain in his back. See id. 
 
Knepp testified that he attempted to help with 
housework, but his wife did 90 percent of it. See id. at 19. 
Knepp also stated that he was capable of cooking meals 
and dressing and bathing himself without assistance. See 
id. Knepp was able to drive, and his automobile did not 
require any special adjustments to accommodate his 
injuries. See id. Knepp stated that on some days, however, 
he could drive only a couple of miles, although on other 
days he could drive for a half hour. See id. at 28. Knepp's 
ability to drive depended upon the state of his back and hip 
pain. See id. For relaxation, Knepp would take walks, sit 
somewhere, or watch television. See id. at 20. Knepp also 
stated that he was able to hunt and visit friends. 
 
During the relevant time period Knepp took 
approximately three Tylenol 3, Motrin or ibuprofen 600s 
pills daily for his pain. See id. at 20. Knepp stated that 
while he was not "perfectly fine" while taking the 
medication, "it sure help[ed] .... it makes a big difference." 
Id. at 20-21. Knepp also testified that during the relevant 
time period he visited Dr. Langton three times per week for 
ultrasound therapy for his back. See id. at 21. 
 
The ALJ called Dr. Peter G. Decker ("Dr. Decker"), a 
board certified internist, as a medical expert. Dr. Decker 
testified based upon his review of Knepp's medical records 
as he did not treat Knepp. See id. at 31. Dr. Decker 
testified that Knepp's impairments arose from his accident 
on October 23, 1984, and that the injuries Knepp sustained 
were the result of "exit" wounds caused by the high voltage 
electrocution. See id. at 32. Dr. Decker outlined Knepp's 
injuries, including the amputation of the left arm above the 
elbow, the trauma to the lower extremities, and the burns 
of the abdomen, lower and upper back, buttocks, left 
shoulder, and right leg. See id. at 32. 
 
In response to the ALJ's question of whether Knepp's 
impairments met or equaled any condition specified in the 
Listing of Impairments contained at 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, 
App. 1 (1999) ("Listed Impairments"), Dr. Decker stated that 
no specific listing described Knepp's injuries. See id. at 34- 
35. 
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Dr. Decker testified that the most applicable listing of 
impairments was 1.13 and that 1.10 C was also relevant to 
Knepp's injuries. See id. at 35-38. Listing 1.10 C and 1.13 
read as follows: 
 
       1.10 Amputation of one lower extremity (at  or above 
       the tarsal region): . . . 
 
       C. Inability to use a prosthesis effectively, with out 
       obligatory assistive devices, due to one of the following: 
 
       1. Vascular disease; or 
 
       2. Neurological complications (e.g., loss of posit ion 
       sense); or 
 
       3. Stump too short or stump complications persiste nt, 
       or are expected to persist, for at least 12 months from 
       onset; or 
 
       4. Disorder of contralateral lower extremity which 
       markedly limits ability to walk and stand. 
 
       1.13 Soft tissue injuries of an upper or lower extremity 
       requiring a series of staged surgical proceedings within 
       12 months after onset for salvage and/or restoration of 
       major function of the extremity, and such major 
       function was not restored or expected to be restored 
       within 12 months after onset. 
 
20 C.F.R., Subpart P, App. 1 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 
Dr. Decker testified that Knepp's burn injuries were 
analogous to the soft tissue injury requirement of Listed 
Impairment 1.13. See app. at 35. Dr. Decker explained that 
he considered the debridements and skin grafting 
procedures that Knepp underwent to be staged surgical 
procedures from which major functioning of the left arm 
never was restored because, even with the surgical 
procedures, Knepp could not be fitted with a functioning 
prosthesis. See id. at 34-35. Dr. Decker further testified 
that Knepp's heels could not be restored to major function 
because of severe tissue loss from burns. See id . at 35-36. 
Dr. Decker noted that in view of the combination of Knepp's 
injuries to his left arm and both feet, he would not expect 
Knepp to be able to walk or stand for long periods of time, 
and because of the injuries to the buttocks, he would not 
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be able to sit for prolonged periods of time. See id. at 35- 
37. Dr. Decker stated that he would expect Knepp to suffer 
chronic pain in both heels, back, and phantom pain in the 
arm. See id. at 33. 
 
Based upon his conclusions, Dr. Decker stated that 
Knepp's condition equaled Listed Impairment 1.13 and that 
Listed Impairment 1.10 was applicable because of the 
number of factors present in that listing consistent with 
Knepp's condition. See id. Dr. Decker's testimony was 
limited to the application of the Listed Impairments. Dr. 
Decker did not make a determination as to Knepp's actual 
ability to perform light work that did not require use of the 
non-dominant upper extremity. 
 
The ALJ also elicited testimony from a vocational expert 
concerning the availability of jobs for someone with Knepp's 
limitations. The ALJ asked the vocational expert to consider 
the situation of a younger individual, aged 47 to 49, with a 
high school education and history of semi-skilled labor, 
capable only of using his dominant right hand, and who 
had to alternate between sitting and standing. See id. at 41. 
It was further assumed that this individual was capable of 
lifting 10 pounds. See id. 
 
The vocational expert concluded that there would be a 
significant number of jobs available to a person with the 
limitations provided by the ALJ. For example, the 
vocational expert testified that such a person would be able 
to perform jobs such as inspector, gate guard, cashier, or 
telephone solicitor. See id. at 43-44. The vocational expert 
did note, however, that the number of jobs available in the 
area of Pennsylvania where Knepp lived was likely to be 
significantly less than the number of jobs available in the 
state as a whole. See id. at 44-45. 
 
As we mentioned, the ALJ issued her opinion on May 6, 
1997. See app. at 71. She began her opinion by noting that 
Knepp already had received disability benefits between 
October 23, 1984, the date of his injury, and May 31, 1986. 
See id. at 71. Accordingly, the ALJ focused her inquiry on 
the period beginning June 1, 1986, and ending on June 30, 
1991, the date Knepp last met the insured status 
requirements. See id. 
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Pursuant to her application of the required five-step 
analysis under the applicable regulations, the ALJfirst 
determined that Knepp had not been engaged in 
substantial gainful activity since June 1, 1986. See id. at 
72. Second, the ALJ determined that the injuries resulting 
from Knepp's electrocution constituted a severe 
impairment. See id. at 73. 
 
The third step of the regulation required the ALJ to 
determine whether Knepp suffered from an impairment, or 
combination of impairments, that either met or equaled a 
Listed Impairment. See id. The ALJ determined that, 
despite the testimony of Dr. Decker, Knepp did not suffer 
from an impairment or combination of impairments that 
either met or equaled a Listed Impairment. See id. The ALJ 
determined that Dr. Decker had not understood properly 
the scope of the provisions he cited as establishing 
disability on the part of Knepp. See id. at 74. 
 
The ALJ then proceeded to the fourth and fifth steps of 
the analysis. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that 
Knepp was unable to perform his past relevant work as a 
boilermaker. See id. at 75. At the fifth step, the ALJ 
concluded that Knepp had the residual functional capacity 
to perform work that does not require bi-lateral dexterity or 
use of the left arm; does not require lifting more than 10-20 
pounds; allows for a sit/stand option; and does not require 
prolonged sitting, standing, or walking. See id . The ALJ 
determined that Knepp was not disabled because there 
were sufficient jobs available in the national economy 
within the limitations described above. See id . 
 
The ALJ, in making her determination that Knepp was 
not disabled, took note of the scope of Knepp's injuries. See 
id. at 76-78. She observed that the treatment notes for 
Knepp through 1986 reflected that Knepp had healed well, 
began to regain body weight, and had begun to increase his 
activity level. See id. at 76. Further, the ALJ noted that 
while Knepp had received treatment for lower back pain 
beginning in 1990, such treatment consisted of 
conservative ultrasound pain management in 1990 and 
1991 with virtually no medical intervention of any type 
from 1992 through 1995. See id. Accordingly, the ALJ 
determined that the evidence in the record did not support 
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a conclusion that Knepp was disabled before June 30, 
1991. See id. at 76-77. 
 
The ALJ found that Knepp's subjective complaints of pain 
were generally credible, but overstated to the extent Knepp 
claimed he had been unable to perform any work since 
June 1, 1986. See id. at 77. She noted that Knepp had 
received only conservative treatments during the period at 
issue, and no diagnostic testing or physical examinations 
were conducted prior to 1996. See id. Further, Knepp's 
daily activities supported the conclusion that he was 
capable of working during the period at issue. See id. 
Accordingly, Knepp was found not to have been disabled 
during the period beginning June 1, 1986 and ending June 
30, 1991. See id. at 80. Thus, the ALJ denied the benefits. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
While we exercise plenary review with respect to the order 
for summary judgment, our review of the ALJ's decision is 
more deferential as we determine whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the decision of the 
Commissioner. See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d 
Cir. 1999). Consequently, we are bound by the ALJ's 
findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. See id. We, however, exercise 
plenary review of all legal issues in this case. See 
Schaudeck v. Comm'r, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
42 U.S.C. S 423(a)(1)(D) provides for the payment of 
benefits to persons who suffer from disabilities who have 
made contributions to the disability insurance program. In 
particular, 42 U.S.C. S 423(d)(1)(A) provides for the payment 
of benefits when a claimant establishes his or her inability: 
 
       to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 
       of any medically determinable physical or mental 
       impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
       which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
       continuous period of not less than 12 months. 
 
42 U.S.C. SS 423(d)(2)(A) then explains that an individual 
 
       shall be determined to be under a disability only if his 
       [or her] physical or mental impairment or impairments 
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       are of such severity that he [or she] is not only unable 
       to do his [or her] previous work but cannot, 
       considering his [or her] age, education and work 
       experience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
       gainful work which exists in the national economy.... 
 
In accordance with authority granted under 42 U.S.C. 
S 405(a), the Commissioner has promulgated the 
regulations applied by the ALJ to give effect to, and further 
define, the provisions of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1520, 
416.920 (1999). We reiterate that the regulations provide 
for the five-step sequential evaluation of an individual's 
claim for disability benefits that the ALJ applied in this 
case. See Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 
In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether 
the claimant currently is engaging in substantial gainful 
activity. 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1520(a), 416.920(a) (1999). 20 
C.F.R. SS 407.1572, 416.972 (1999). If a claimant is found 
to be engaged in substantial gainful activity, his claim of 
disability will be denied, regardless of the claimant's 
medical condition. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 
140, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2291 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.1520(b)). As mentioned, the ALJ determined that 
Knepp had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity 
during the period at issue. This determination is not 
disputed. 
 
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful 
activity, the analysis of the claim proceeds to step two. Step 
two, commonly known as the "severity regulation," involves 
a minimum threshold determination of whether the 
claimant is suffering from a severe impairment. See 20 
C.F.R. S 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (1999). An impairment is 
considered severe if it is "of a magnitude sufficient to limit 
significantly the individual's `physical or mental ability to 
do basic work activities.' " Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 
925, 927 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520(c) 
(1999)). The ability to do basic work activities is defined as 
 
       `the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.' 
       Such abilities and aptitudes include `[p]hysical 
       functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, 
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       pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling'; 
       `[c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking'; 
       `[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering 
       simple instructions'; `[u]se of judgment';`[r]esponding 
       appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual 
       work situations'; and `[d]ealing with changes in a 
       routine work setting.' 
 
Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141, 107 S.Ct. at 2291 (quoting 20 
C.F.R. S 404.1521(b) (1999)). An ALJ only considers medical 
evidence in step two, without regard to vocational factors 
such as the claimant's age, education, or work experience. 
See id. (citing 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (1999)). 
The ALJ determined that Knepp suffered from "severe" 
impairments, as that term is defined by the Act, and that 
finding is not in dispute. 
 
If, as here, the claimant is not engaged in substantial 
gainful activity and has a severe impairment, the evaluation 
proceeds to step three. Step three requires a determination 
of "whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a 
number of Listed Impairments that the Commissioner 
acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial 
gainful activity." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141, 107 S.Ct. at 
2291. "If the impairment meets or equals [a] [L]isted 
[I]mpairment [ ], the claimant is conclusively presumed to 
be disabled." Id., 107 S.Ct. at 2291; see also 20 C.F.R. 
SS 404.1520(d), 416.920(d) (1999). 
 
If a claimant does not suffer from a Listed Impairment or 
its equivalent, the analysis proceeds to steps four and five. 
Under these steps, the Commissioner "must determine 
whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either 
his [or her] former work or some less demanding 
employment." See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 535, 
110 S.Ct. 885, 893-94 (1990) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also, Williams, 970 F.2d at 1187. 
 
On this appeal, Knepp challenges only the conclusion 
that there was substantial evidence in the record to support 
the finding of the ALJ that he did not meet or equal the 
requirements of Listed Impairment 1.13 or 1.10. Knepp 
does not assert that he should have been found disabled 
pursuant to any other Listed Impairment. In addition, 
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Knepp does not challenge the findings of the ALJ relevant 
to his ability to perform the requirements of a limited, but 
sufficiently available, number of light work positions. 
Accordingly, Knepp can succeed on this appeal only if we 
find that the conclusions of the ALJ relevant to Listed 
Impairments 1.13 and 1.10 are unsupported by substantial 
evidence or were contrary to the law. Thus, this appeal is 
limited to a challenge to the ALJ's step three determination. 
 
In view of the limited nature of Knepp's appeal, he sets 
forth the sole issue for our consideration as follows: 
 
       Was it improper for the Commissioner to reject the 
       testimony of Peter G. Decker, MD, a medical expert, 
       who testified at the hearing before the Administrative 
       Law Judge, that the Appellant's impairment was so 
       severe that it equaled the severity set forth in the 
       Listing of Impairments. 
 
Appellant Br. at 1. As we demonstrate below, the resolution 
of this question in the circumstances here turns primarily 
on questions of law and not on questions of fact. Thus, we 
are exercising plenary review. 
 
The Listed Impairments define impairments that prevent 
an adult, regardless of age, education, or work experience, 
from performing any gainful activity. See Zebley , 493 U.S. 
at 532, 110 S.Ct. at 892. Thus, as we have indicated, if a 
claimant's impairments meet or equal a Listed Impairment 
disability is conclusively established and the claimant is 
awarded benefits. 
 
Knepp, citing 20 C.F.R. S 404.1526(c) (1999), argues that 
only a physician designated by the Commissioner can 
decide the question of medical equivalency. See  Appellant 
Br. at 9. This argument misapprehends 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.1526. The ultimate decision concerning the disability 
of a claimant is reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 
C.F.R. S 404.1527(e) (1999). 
 
The regulations provide the following guidelines for 
determining if a claimant's impairments meet or equal a 
Listed Impairment. 
 
       (a) How medical equivalence is determined. We will 
       decide that your impairment(s) is medically equivalent 
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       to a listed impairment in Appendix 1 if the medical 
       findings are at least equal in severity and duration to 
       the listed findings. We will compare the symptoms, 
       signs, and laboratory findings about your 
       impairment(s), as shown in the medical evidence we 
       have about your claim, with the medical criteria shown 
       with the listed impairment. If your impairment is not 
       listed, we will consider the listed impairment most like 
       your impairment to decide whether your impairment is 
       medically equal. If you have more than one 
       impairment, and none of them meets or equals a listed 
       impairment, we will review the symptoms, signs, and 
       laboratory findings about your impairments to 
       determine whether the combination of your 
       impairments is medically equal to any listed 
       impairment. 
 
       (b) Medical equivalence must be based on medical 
       findings. We will always base our decision about 
       whether your impairment(s) is medically equal to a 
       listed impairment on medical evidence only. Any 
       medical findings in the evidence must be supported by 
       medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 
       techniques. We will also consider the medical opinion 
       given by one or more medical or psychological 
       consultants designated by the Commissioner in 
       deciding medical equivalence. (See S 404.1616.) 
 
       (c) Who is a designated medical . . . consultant. A 
       medical . . . consultant designated by the 
       Commissioner includes any medical . . . consultant 
       employed or engaged to make medical judgments by 
       the Social Security Administration, the Railroad 
       Retirement Board, or a State agency authorized to 
       make disability determinations. A medical consultant 
       must be a physician. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 404.1562 (1999). 
 
In rejecting the testimony of Dr. Decker concerning the 
applicability of Listed Impairment 1.13, the ALJ stated: 
 
       I am unable to accept Dr. Decker's testimony that the 
       claimant's condition continues to equal the severity 
       requirements of Listing 1.13 in the light of my re- 
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       examination of the medical record. In the present case, 
       the claimant's left arm required amputation 
       immediately following his injury. He did not undergo a 
       series of surgical procedures and restoration of 
       function was clearly not anticipated. 
 
App. at 73-74. 
 
While we seem not to have addressed the proper scope of 
Listed Impairment 1.13, the ALJ's construction of that 
listing was consistent with that of the courts of appeals 
that have addressed the issue. The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has determined that Listed Impairment 
1.13 is: 
 
       directed to the loss of the use of one extremity, not in 
       itself disabling under the regulations, where restoration 
       of function will require repeated staged surgical 
       procedures over a lengthy period, thus making an 
       individual who would otherwise be capable of 
       substantial gainful employment unavailable for work 
       because of these repeated surgical procedures. 
 
Waite v. Bowen, 819 F.2d 1356, 1359 (7th Cir. 1987). The 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has agreed with this 
interpretation, concluding that Listed Impairment 1.13 is 
meant to address a claimant who is rendered disabled as a 
result of being unavailable for employment during the 
course of the staged surgical procedures and recovery 
periods. See Lapinksy v. Secretary, 857 F.2d 1071, 1073 
(6th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the courts construe Listed 
Impairment 1.13 as applicable only to persons undergoing 
surgical procedures designed to restore functionality. 
 
In Waite, the court considered a claimant whose left arm 
had been paralyzed completely and permanently in a 
motorcycle accident. See Waite, 819 F.2d at 1358. The 
claimant also had suffered leg injuries that had healed. See 
id. The claimant argued that his paralyzed left arm met or 
equaled the requirements of Listed Impairment 1.13. See 
id. at 1359. The court, however, determined that Listed 
Impairment 1.13 was not met or equaled by simply any 
form of loss of use of an extremity for 12 or more months. 
The court there concluded that Listed Impairment 1.13 was 
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established to allow a period of recovery for surgical 
restoration of an impaired limb. See id. at 1360. 
 
This interpretation of Listed Impairment 1.13 is 
 833<!>reasonable given its emphasis on staged surgical 
 
proceedings and the restoration or salvage of functionality. 
Further, Listed Impairments 1.09 and 1.10 directly address 
amputations. Listed Impairment 1.09 requires the loss of 
both hands, both feet, or one hand and one foot in order for 
a claimant to be found conclusively disabled. See 20 C.F.R., 
Subpart P., App. 1 (1999). Listed Impairment 1.10 allows 
for a finding of disability upon the amputation of a lower 
extremity above the tarsal region. See id. Any reading of 
Listed Impairment 1.13 that would allow for a finding of 
disability upon the amputation of one extremity would 
place 1.13 in conflict with 1.09,1 a provision expressly 
addressing amputation, and would render 1.13 and 1.10 
mere redundancies. Consequently, we are convinced that 
the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
have advanced a construction that provides the proper 
understanding of Listed Impairment 1.13. 
 
Accordingly, as with the claimant in Waite, Knepp could 
be found to meet or equal Listed Impairment 1.13 only if, 
during the time period at issue, which ended on June 30, 
1991, his impairments, when viewed as a whole, met or 
equaled surgical procedures designed to restore the 
functioning of his left arm. The medical record does not 
contain any facts which could support such a conclusion. 
Review of the medical records demonstrates that Knepp did 
not undergo any surgical proceedings during the period 
beginning June 1, 1986, and ending June 30, 1991, nor 
has Knepp pointed to any evidence of a procedure 
equivalent to restorative surgery that occurred during the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For example, Listed Impairment 1.09 clearlyfinds that only the 
amputation of both hands, or the amputation of one hand and one foot 
are severe enough to warrant a presumption of disability. If Listed 
Impairment 1.13 were to be read as Knepp suggests, a claimant could be 
found to be presumptively disabled upon the loss of only one hand if the 
claimant had undergone operations to allow for thefitting of a 
prosthesis. Such a reading of Listed Impairment 1.13 would be 
inconsistent with Listed Impairment 1.09, a provision directly addressing 
the effects of amputation. 
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time period at issue. Rather, Knepp underwent the 
debridements and skin grafting procedures prior to that 
period. 
 
Knepp's arguments that his impairments meet or equal 
Listed Impairment 1.13 all rest upon a misapprehension of 
the scope of that provision. For example, Knepp argues that 
the ALJ erroneously relied upon the fact that all of Knepp's 
surgical procedures occurred immediately following his 
accident, during a period for which he was provided 
disability benefits, and not during the period here at issue. 
See Reply Br. at 2-3. Given that Listed Impairment 
addresses only those situations in which the surgical 
procedures themselves contribute to the claimant's inability 
to work, the fact that Knepp did not undergo any surgical 
procedures after June 1, 1986, is determinative. 
 
Knepp also argues that the ALJ should not have 
disregarded Dr. Decker's opinion because there are no 
medical opinions in the record contrary to his position. See 
Appellant Br. at 13-14; Reply Br. at 3. Contrary to the 
assertion of Knepp, the fact that the ALJ disregarded the 
opinion of Dr. Decker does not demonstrate that the ALJ 
simply was asserting her own medical opinion over that of 
the medical expert. Rather, the ALJ in this case properly 
did not accept Dr. Decker's opinion because the doctor 
asserted that Knepp's impairments met or equaled a Listed 
Impairment that is simply inapplicable to this matter. 
 
Further, Dr. Decker also appears to have misapplied 
Listed Impairment 1.10 C. Dr. Decker asserted, and Knepp 
now argues, that 1.10 C is relevant because Knepp suffered 
injuries to both of his heels, experienced balance difficulties 
as a result of the loss of his left arm, and was not able to 
use a prosthesis effectively. See Appellant Br. at 15. Listed 
Impairment 1.10, however, expressly is concerned with the 
amputation of a lower extremity. See 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, 
App. 1. The inability to use a prosthesis, as contemplated 
by 1.10 C, clearly is meant to be a prosthesis designed to 
replace the amputated lower extremity, and not simply 
trouble with any prosthesis. In addition, we find no support 
in Dr. Decker's testimony, or elsewhere in the medical 
record, for the conclusion that Knepp's impairments to his 
heels and calves equaled the amputation of a lower 
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extremity. It would appear that, as a matter of law, Listed 
Impairment 1.10 has no applicability to the instant action. 
 
Knepp essentially argues throughout his submissions 
that a decision concerning the applicability of a Listed 
Impairment is a medical decision. But that argument 
cannot overcome the circumstance that the medical expert 
attempted to apply provisions of the regulations that were 
not applicable to this case as a matter of law. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons we have stated, the order of the district 
court entered March 31, 1999, granting summary judgment 
will be affirmed. 
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